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The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection: Recent 
Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties 
Because consumer protection is an important aspect of the eco-
nomics of production and distribution, it is hardly surprising that 
significant changes throughout the years in our system of marketing 
have been accompanied by corresponding developments in our law 
of products liability. Traditionally, the most common form of re-
dress for an injury caused by a defective product has been a suit 
against the seller of the offending merchandise for breach of warranty. 
A warranty action originally sounded in tort; however, a warranty 
itself-a seller's express or implied representation concerning the 
quality of his goods-soon took on the character of an element of 
the contract under which a product was sold. This development ac-
counts for the existence of those features which today distinguish 
suits for breach of warranty from actions based on negligence or 
fraud.1 Modern warranty recovery is not premised on a warrantor's 
subjective fault, but rather on his absolute liability for a breach of 
promise-the implied promise to his buyer that the quality of par-
ticular goods would be as represented.2 Therefore, an injured party 
suing on a warranty theory is spared the often difficult task of prov-
ing the seller's negligence. On the other hand, the contractual nature 
of a warranty injects into an action for breach of warranty the age-
old complexities of contract law, with the result that many obstacles 
dot the injured purchaser's path to recovery. On balance, however, 
the history of the law of warranty has been one of continual progress 
away from the concept of caveat emptor toward that of greater con-
sumer protection.3 This transition is largely attributable to the will-
ingness of courts to modify or circumvent the traditional applica-
tions of a number of contract-law principles in an effort to develop 
a warranty theory adapted to the needs of a commercial community 
where a buyer frequently cannot inspect the goods that he purchases 
( or, if he can examine them, does not have the specialized knowledge 
necessary to detect their defects) and where a product may pass 
through the hands of several persons before it reaches an ultimate 
user, who may or may not be a purchaser. 
As might have been expected, the courts have not confined their 
efforts in updating the law of products liability to fostering innova-
1. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLUM, L. REV. 699 (1936). 
2. 1 Wn.usroN, SALES § 237 (1948 ed.). 
3. "The nineteenth-century policy of protecting young manufacturers is now giving 
way to one of protecting innocent consumers from unexpected injuries or losses due 
to defective products over which they have no control." Picker X-ray Corp. v. General 
Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 921 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962); see Jaeger, Warranties 
of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 
493, 494-503 (1962). For a comparison with the development of civil law, see Kessler, 
The Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law, 74 YALE L.J. 262 (1964). 
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tions in that segment dealing with warranties. The struggle to im-
pose strict tort liability upon a manufacturer for harm caused by his 
defective products has made significant advances and is continuing:' 
However, the citadel has yet to be taken. Indeed, even the California 
Supreme Court, which may be considered the leading proponent of 
this strict tort theory, has limited its availability so that only those 
seeking redress for harm to person or property may invoke the doc-
trine; thus, a plaintiff hoping to recover for a purely economic loss 
is restricted to an action for breach of warranty.5 It thus appears that 
the warranty theory will continue to play a major role in consumer 
protection. This Comment will treat some of the more recent devel-
opments relating to the warranty theory, of which perhaps the most 
significant are the changes wrought by the Uniform Commercial 
Code, which has been adopted by the legislatures in an overwhelm-
ing majority of American jurisdictions.6 
I. TYPES OF WARRANTIES 
A warranty is often formally defined as 
a statement or representation made by the seller of goods 
contemporaneously with, and as a part of, the contract of sale, 
although collateral to the express object of it, having reference 
to the character, quality, or title of the goods, and by which he 
promises or undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall 
be as he represents them.7 
Warranties are generally classified as either express (those based 
4. Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 
(1963); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel: Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). 
5. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965), where 
Chief Justice Traynor remarked: "The law of sales has been carefully articu-
lated to govern the economic relations between suppliers and consumers of goods. 
The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, 
not to undermine the warranty provisions of the Sales Act or the Uniform Commer-
cial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries." 45 
Cal. Rptr. at 21, 403 P.2d at 149. But see Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Santor v. A &: M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 
305 (1965). 
6. The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.] provisions con-
cerned with sales warranties are §§ 2-312 to -318, 2-715, -718, -719. Each Code section 
is followed by an official comment, written by someone associated with the drafting 
of that provision, apparently designed to clarify the draftsmen's intent. Section 1-102(£) 
of the 1952 edition of the Code stated that these comments were to be consulted by 
courts construing and applying the act, but no similar provision appears in later 
editions. The comments do not represent the law; however, since a legislature should 
be presumed to have been aware of their exfatence when it enacted the Code, they 
may be considered to have the weight of legislative history. See FARNSWORTH &: HON-
NOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW 7-10 (1965). 
7. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 301, at 1115 (1952), quoted with approval in Mitchell v. Ruda-
sill, 332 S.W.2d 91, 94-95 (Mo. App. 1960); see Jaeger, Products Liability: The Con-
structive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 501, 506 (1964). -
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upon actual representations made by a seller) or implied (those 
attributable to representations arising by operation of law from the 
nature of a particular transaction). 
A. Express Warranties 
The Uniform Sales Act,8 the basic statutory guide to the law of 
the marketplace before the advent of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, defined an express warranty as "any affirmation of fact or any 
promise by the seller relating to the goods . . . if the natural 
tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer 
to purchase the goods, and the buyer purchases the goods relying 
thereon."9 
Section 2-313(l)(a), the corresponding provision of the Code, de-
fines an express warranty in a similar manner: "Any affirmation of 
fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the 
goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise." 
Section 2-313(l)(b) provides that "any description of the goods which 
is made a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty 
that the goods shall conform to the description," and section 2-313 
(l)(c) states that "any sample or model which is made part of the 
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of 
the goods shall conform to the sample or model." 
The Code requirement that in order to create an express war-
ranty, an affirmation or promise must be part of the basis of a bar-
gain-a phrase which has been said to mean that a particular repre-
sentation could reasonably have induced a buyer to act10-seems to 
have been intended to be largely equivalent to the Sales Act prin-
ciple that in order to give rise to an express warranty, a representa-
tion must have had a natural tendency to induce a buyer to purchase. 
However, by not explicitly requiring a plaintiff-buyer to show that 
he relied upon a particular allegedly inaccurate representation, the 
draftsmen of the Code may have intended to place upon the seller 
the burden of demonstrating that the affirmation or the promise was 
not part of a particular agreement.11 Under the Sales Act, the burden 
theoretically rested on a buyer to establish that he had relied on a 
seller's representations.12 Nevertheless, in practice it was often suffi-
8. The Uniform Sales Act [hereinafter cited as U.S.A.] was drafted in 1906 and 
was largely the work of Professor Samuel Williston. In many of its sections the Uniform 
Sales Act followed very closely the British Sale of Goods Act of 1893. Although it is 
rapidly being replaced by the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Sales Act was 
once the law of thirty American jurisdictions. F ARNSWORTII &: HONNOLD, op. cit. supra 
note 6, at 5. 
9. U.S.A. § 12. 
10. HAWK.LAND, TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 58 (1964), 
11. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 3. 
12. Pedroli v. Russell, 157 Cal. App. 2d 281, ~20 P.2d 873 (1958); Midland Loan 
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dent for a buyer to show only that the representations were of a 
kind which naturally would have induced him to purchase and that 
he did purchase goods concerning which the representations had 
been made.13 Thus, despite its change in language, the Code appears 
to effect little change in the law. · 
Code section 2-209(1) provides that once a contract has· been 
made, it may be modified by agreement of the parties, even though 
no additional consideration passes between them. Relying upon this 
provision, the writers of the official explanatory comment to section 
2-313 stated that the "precise time · when words of description or 
affirmation are made or samples are shown is not material,"14 and 
thereby left the impression that express warranties may arise out of 
statements which become known to a purchaser only after a trans-
action has been completed. For example, a buyer may purchase a 
factory-packaged drill bit in a transaction in which no express war-
ranties were created at the time of sale, and then, upon opening 
the box in his home and reading the enclosed instructions, discovers 
that they clearly indicate that the bit will cut through concrete. The 
comment to section 2-313 suggests that if the tool 1Vill not in fact 
make a hole in concrete, he could recover damages for breach of an 
express warranty, although the statement inside the package did not 
in any way induce him to buy the bit. However, this result would be 
impossible to reconcile with the requirement in section 2-313(1) that 
language creating an express warranty must be a part of the basis of 
a bargain. If, on the other hand, the purchaser of the drill bit had 
extracted an: additional promise from his seller after the sale that 
the bit would cut through concrete, section 2-209(1) would probably 
operate to effect a modification of the contract by agreement to in-
clude an obligation on the part of the seller similar to that which 
would have arisen had the seller expressly warranted the product's 
capability prior to the sale. In any event, a buyer's post-sale discovery 
of a statement inside a package may have some legal significance. I£ 
the buyer relied on the representation in using the product and was 
injured because the statement proved to have been untrue, ·the seller 
could be liable on a tort theory of misrepresentation.15 
Section 2-313(2) codifies a common-law concept by providing that 
"an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement pur-
porting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the 
goods does not create a warranty."16 This idea is probably already 
Fin. Co. v. Madsen, 217 Minn. 267, 14 N.W.2d 475 (1944); Lewitus v. Brown & Seccomb, 
228 App. Div. 146, 239 N.Y. Supp. 261 (1930). , 
• I 
13. Steiner v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. Super. 869, 280 P.2d 235 (Super. Ct. 1955); 1 WILLIS• 
TON, SALF.5 534-35 (1948 ed.). 
14. U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 7. 
15. See PROSSER, TORTS 729 (1964). 
16. U.S.A. § 12 provided: "No affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any state-
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inherent in the requirement of section 2-313(1) that a statement 
must be part of the basis of a bargain to create an express warranty, 
because statements of the kind mentioned in section 2-313(2), com-
monly characterized as "puffing" or "dealer's talk," would not usu- · 
ally induce a reasonable buyer to act. Of course, even if a particular 
representation does not create an express warranty, it may form the 
basis for an action for fraud or misrepresentation.17 
A major change effected by section 2-313(1) relates to warranties 
of "description" and "sample." A warranty of description arises 
under the Code, as it did under the Sales Act, when a sale is made 
on the basis of a seller's description of particular goods; the warranty 
is breached if the merchandise does not conform to that description. 
Under the Sales Act, a warranty of this type was designated an im-
plied warranty.18 Often, however, the descriptive words upon which 
a warranty of description was founded could also be taken as affirma-
tions of the kind creating an express warranty, thereby providing a 
disappointed buyer with a choice of warranty theories upon which 
to seek relief. Although there appears to have been no reason why 
express and implied warranties should have been treated as mutually 
exclusive, courts persisted in attempting to fit particular descriptive 
words into one category or the other.19 Classifying descriptive words 
either as affirmations of fact creating an express warranty or as sim-
ple words of description giving rise to an implied warranty was often 
difficult under the Sales Act; however, such a determination was rarely 
important. Proper categorization could have affected the outcome of 
a case only when the sale leading to the litigation had been one in 
which the seller had successfully disclaimed the existence of all im-
plied warranties but had not effectively protected himself from the 
express warranty liability created by the descriptive words.20 The 
Code resolves any dispute which may arise concerning the proper 
classification of descriptive words in favor of the express warranty 
label; consequently, any attempt to disclaim the existence of warran-
ties of description will probably prove ineffective because section 
2-316(1) invalidates a purported disclaimer in so far as it is incon-
sistent with the terms of any express warranty.21 
ment purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as 
a warranty." See Shay v. Joseph, 219 Md. 279, 149 A.2d 3 (1959); Brown v. Globe Labs., 
Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W .2d 151 (1957); I WILLISTON, SALES § 202 (1948 ed.). 
17. See generally Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negli• 
gence, and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1351-55 (1966). 
18. U.S.A. § 14. 
19. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note IO, at 60. 
20. See Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 
1951). 
21. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 4. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) provides: "Words or conduct 
relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate 
or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each 
other; but •.• negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construc-
tion is unreasonable." See text accompanying note 126 infra. 
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Under the Sales Act, when a seller displayed a sample or a model 
purporting to depict the nature and quality of certain goods, and a 
buyer then purchased merchandise in reliance upon what he had 
seen, there arose an implied warranty "of sample" that the goods 
would correspond to the representations.22 This type of warranty 
also exists under the Code, but is classified as an express warranty; 
therefore, if a seller shows a sample which becomes the basis of a 
bargain between him and his customer, the result could be the same 
as if he had expressly stated that the goods which the sample sup-
posedly represented would conform to it. The existence of a war-
ranty "of sample" in a Code jurisdiction is premised upon the fact 
that a sample or a model was intended to represent, or to be of the· 
character of, the goods on sale. However, occasionally an article 
shown to a buyer may be meant merely to suggest the character of the 
merchandise. In this case, the sample or model would probably not 
be the basis of any resulting bargain and thus would not normally 
give rise to an express warranty.23 A similar outcome would have 
followed from the law as it developed in most Sales Act juris-
dictions. 24 
Under the Code, an express warranty is supposed to be the result 
of "dickering" between a buyer and a seller.25 However, the official 
comment to section 2-313 suggests that the Code's draftsmen felt that 
no specific intention on the part of a seller to make an express war-
ranty should be necessary in order for his conduct to give rise to 
one.26 The widespread enactment of the Code should therefore en-
courage courts to rely upon those cases in which sellers have been 
held liable to purchasers on an express warranty theory when mer-
chandise did not measure up to the claims, even those that did not 
rise to the level of descriptions, made for it in advertisements and 
sales literature and on product labels.27 
B. Implied Warranties 
1. Merchantability 
The most significant implied warranty arising from a sale of 
goods is that of merchantability. Section 15(2) of the Sales Act stated 
that "where the goods are bought by description from a seller who 
22. U.S.A. § 16. 
1 23. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 6. , 
24. See Somerville Container Sales v. General Metal Corp., 39 N.J. Super. 348, 120 
A.2d 866 (App. Div.), modified, 39 N.J. Super. 562, 121 A.2d '746 (App. Div. 1956). 
25. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 1. 
26. U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 3. 
27. Pritchard v. Liggett &: Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965); Smith 
v. Gates Rubber Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 307 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Randy Knitwear 
Inc. v. American Cyanamide Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); 
Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965). For the 
effect of the Code on the question of privity, see text accompanying note 108 infra. 
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deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or man-
ufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall 
be of merchantable quality." When it was drafted, this provision 
was declaratory of the law in all states except those in which courts 
drew a distinction between sellers who were also manufacturers and 
those who were simply dealers and held that only transactions involv-
ing the former type of merchant gave rise to implied warranties of 
merchantability.2s , 
While an implied warranty of merchantability arose under the 
Sales Act only if a seller dealt in merchandise similar to that actu-
ally sold, in a Code jurisdiction such a warranty grows out of a sale 
if the seller, is a "merchant" with respect to the goods involved. It 
might seem that section 2-314 is more inclusive than its Sales Act 
counterpart, since section 2-104(1) defines a merchant as a person 
who deals in goods of a particular kind or otherwise holds himself 
out as someone having "knowledge or skill peculiar to the [ com-
mercial] practices or goods" involved in a given transaction. How-
ever, the comment to section 2-31~, the provision specifically deal-
ing with the warranty of merchantability, suggests that the term 
"merchant" as used in this section was intended to have a slightly 
more restricted meaning; the comment indicates that no warranty 
of this type arises when a person makes an "isolated sale of goods."20 
It would thus appear that no warranty of merchantability would 
grow out of a transaction such as a sale by an automobile mechanic 
of his own car, despite the fact that he possesses "knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the ... goods." This result would be entirely reasonable, 
because a mechanic does not have an adequate knowledge of sales 
law to be competent to appreciate the extent of an obligation im-
posed by a warranty of merchantability and to protect himself by 
effectively disclaiming warranty liability. Moreover, he would be 
unable to distribute among a host of customers the financial burden 
which would be imposed if he breached such an obligation.Bo Of 
course, even an individual making an isolated sale has a duty to deal 
in good faith and must therefore disclose to his buyer the existence 
of any material but hidden defect of which the seller is aware.B1 
Code section 2-314 contains some important advances over sec-
tion 15(2) of the Sales Act. The older provision did not define the 
term "merchantable quality," but most courts held that a product 
met this description if it was "fit for the general purpose for which 
28. See Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 517, 235 S.W.2d 988, 990 (1951); Bochcck Con-
str. Equip. Corp. v. H. Fuller & Sons, Inc., 19 Wis. 2d 658, 662, 121 N.W.2d 303, 306 
(1963). For cases making a distinction between a dealer and a manufacturer-seller, see 
, 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 232 (1948 ed.). 
29. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 3. 
30. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, at 70. 
31. u.c.c. § 1-203. 
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[it was] manufactured and sold,''32 or was "suitable for the ordinary 
use for which [it was] sold."33 A few courts simply said that a prod-
uct was unmerchantable if it was "unsalable."34 On the other hand, 
section 2-314(2) provides a comprehensive but nonexclusive defini-
tion of the word "merchantable,"35 the most important aspect of 
which, from the consumer purchaser's point of view, is the codifica-
tion of the rule followed by those courts that took the position that 
particular goods were merchantable if they were fit for the purposes 
for which they were ordinarily used.36 The Code further states in 
section 2-314(2)(a), however, that goods are merchantable only if 
they would "pass without objection in the trade."37 If this language 
was intended to mean that a warranty of merchantability is breached 
whenever a buyer objects to the quality of merchandise sold to him, 
it would suggest a greatly expanded concept of the nature of the 
protection afforded by this type of warranty.38 Apparently no cases 
have yet interpreted this phrase, and the official comment to section 
2-314 is of little help in discovering the draftsmen's intent, beyond 
a suggestion that the words in question are to be read together with 
section 2-314(2)(b), a provision indicating that fungible goods are 
merchantable only if they are of "fair average quality."39 Because 
fungible goods are usually associated with tra11sactions between com-
mercial parties, the comment raises the possibility that the "pass 
without objection in the trade" test was designed to be applicable 
only in the context of commercial dealings and that it has no rele-
vance in the setting of consumer sales. On the other hand, perhaps 
the troublesome language will eventually be construed to mean 
32. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,.32 N.J. 358, 370, 161 A.2d 69, 76 (1960). 
33. Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 729, 151 N.E.2d 263, 265 
(1958); Mead v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440, 442, 108 N.E.2d 757, 758 (1953). 
34. Moore v. Hubbard & Johnson Lumber Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d 236, 241, 308 P.2d 
794, 797 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
35. U.C.C. § 2-314 provides: 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the de-
scription; and · 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or 
label if any. 
The accompanying explanatory comment suggests that these tests were not meant 
to be all-inclusive. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 6. 
36. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c), set out in note 35 supra. 
37. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), set out in note 35 supra. 
38. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of 
Sales, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 293 (1951). 
39. U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 7. Fungible goods are defined by the U.C.C. as those 
"of which any unit is, by nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like 
unit.'' U.C.C. § 1-201(17). 
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nothing more than that the testimony of one who has dealt with 
merchandise of the type giving rise to a dispute will be admissible, 
as it traditionally has been, to aid in determining whether a par-
ticular product would have been acceptable for resale "in the 
trade."40 
The Code makes an important addition to the standard of mer-
chantability by requiring that goods must "conform to [any] ..• 
promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label."41 
This provision would seem to afford increased consumer protection 
by rejecting the "adoption rule," which shielded a retailer from 
liability for having sold a product.not measuring up to the manufac-
turer's claims printed on the package unless the dealer, by conduct 
other than simply stocking the merchandise, had "adopted" such 
claims as his own representations.42 However, this provision may 
have less significance at present than it would have had a few years 
ago,. because the trend among courts today is toward allowing a con-
sumer purchaser to sue a manufacturer for breach of an express 
warranty created by statements on a container of a factory-packaged 
product, despite a lack of privity of contract between the plaintiff 
and the producer.43 
Under the Sales Act, a sale must have been "by description" in 
order for an implied warranty of merchantability to arise. Although 
the term "by description" was not defined in the act, courts regu-
larly held that there had been no sale by description, and therefore 
no warranty of merchantability accompanying the transfer of title, 
if a buyer had selected specific goods.44 Where the Code is in ef-
fect, the "description rule" no longer exists; the only general re-
quirement which must be met in order for an implied warranty of 
merchantability to grow out of a sale of goods is that the seller be 
"a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."45 The Code's rejec-
tion of the old principle should have the effect of extending the 
benefit of the warranty of merchantability to more consumer buyers, 
who usually choose specific goods from a shelf, as opposed to com-
mercial or industrial purchasers, who are inclined to order merchan-
dise by general description or, at most, by trade name.46 Neverthe-
40. See generally 1 FRUMER & FruEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.02[1] (1965). 
41. u.c.c. § 2-314(2)(£). 
42. HAwKLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, at 69-70. See generally Cochran v. McDonald, 
23 Wash. 2d 348, 161 P.2d 305 (1945). 
43. See text accompanying note 102 infra. 
44. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 230 (1948 ed.). 
45. u.c.c. § 2-314(1). 
46. Even before the advent of the Code, some courts had already expanded the 
scope of "sale by description" to include specific goods. See Kohn v. Ball, 36 Tenn, 
App. 281, 286, 254 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1953): "The term sale by description strictly 
means an executory sale where the article is not present, but the term has been 
broadened to include all sales, whether or not the goods are present, where there is 
no adequate opportunity for inspection." 
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less, even in a Code jurisdiction, a buyer of specific goods may make 
himself ineligible for the protection- of the implied warranty of 
merchantability. Section 2-316(3)(b) states that "when the buyer 
before entering into the contract [ of sale] has examined the goods 
. . . or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied war-
ranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the 
circumstances to have revealed to him." However, the official com-
ment to this section suggests that a consumer purchaser is given 
some protection by the fact that a "particular buyer's skill and the 
normal method of examining goods in the circumstances determine 
what defects are excluded [from the scope of the warranty coverage] 
by the examination."47 
2. Implied Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose 
Sales of goods often give rise to a second type of implied war-
ranty, that of fitness for a particular purpose. In language expressive 
of the common law in the early twentieth century,48 the Sales Act 
stated in sections 15(1) and (4): 
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known 
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are re-
quired, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill 
or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or 
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be rea-
sonably fit for such purpose .... In the case of a contract to 
sell or a sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade 
name, there is no implied warranty as to its fitness for any 
particular purpose. 
Section 2-315 of the Code provides: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to 
know any particular purpose for which the goods are required 
and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment 
to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or 
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the 
goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
The most significant change effected by this Code section is the 
rejection of the "patent or trade name" rule, codified by the Sales 
Act, by which no warranty of fitness for a particular purpose attached 
to the sale of merchandise requested by its brand name. Apparently, 
it was presumed as a matter of law that a buyer who knew enough 
about a product to ask for it .by its trade name was not relying on 
a seller's judgment to select goods capable of fulfilling a special 
47. U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 8; see text accompanying note 137 infra. 
48. See McNabb v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 272 Ky. 112, 113 S.W.2d 470 (1938); 
Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 Atl. 105 (1938). . 
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need.49 In a Code jurisdiction, the existence of a warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose is always a question of fact and depends 
only upon a finding, from all the circumstances surrounding a given 
sale, both that the seller of the goods in question had reason to 
know the buyer's intended use for them (although the seller need 
not have had actual knowledge) and also that the buyer did in fact , 
rely upon the seller's judgment in choosing a product to fulfill that 
purpose. A purchaser's asking for a product by its brand name is 
no longer conclusive evidence that no warranty of this type accom-
panied a sale, but merely serves as some indication that he did not 
rely upon the seller's judgment.50 In an attempt to mitigate the 
harshness of the "trade name rule," a few courts applied a similar 
principle in Sales Act cases in which, after a seller had recom-
mended a particular brand of merchandise to fulfill a special pur-
pose, a buyer ordered it by its trade name.51 The Code approach is 
certainly reasonable in an age when many products are regularly 
identified by trade name and when a plaintiff may have been in-
duced to ask for a brand-name item by a defendant's own assurances 
in his advertising that it would serve a particular purpose. 
It appears that both a warranty of merchantability and one of 
fitness for a particular purpose may grow out of the same sale,li2 
For example, a purchaser buying an automobile with the special 
intention of entering a stock car race might reasonably anticipate 
that the car will also be suitable as a means of ordinary transporta-
tion. Since the latter is the ordinary purpose for which automobiles 
are sold, his expectation in this regard is protected by an implied 
warranty of merchantability.53 In addition, if the seller knew of the 
buyer's special intended use and if the purchaser relied upon the 
seller to furnish a vehicle fit for that use, an implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose would also arise. 
Some courts have even reasoned that a warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose is created automatically by the mere sale of an 
article which has only one ordinary use.54 For example, in Kirh v. 
Stineway Drug Store Co.,55 where plaintiff had been injured while 
climbing a stepladder, the court found an implied warranty of fit-
ness for a particular purpose accompanying the sale of the ladder, 
49. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 286a (1948 ed.). 
50. See U.C.C. § 2-315, comments 1 and 5. 
51. See Buchanan v. Ducan, 82 A.2d 911 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1951); Green Mountain 
Mushroom Co. v. Brown, 117 Vt. 509, 95 A.2d 679 (1953). 
52. See U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 2; HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, at 68, 
53. See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
54. Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149, 152 (9th. Cir. 1962) (hula skirts); Kirk v. 
Stineway Drug Store Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 415, 422, 187 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1963) (steplad• 
der); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 612, 187 A.2d 575, 576•77 (1963) 
(soda water). 
55. 38 Ill. App. 2d 415, 187 N.E.2d 307 (1963) (decided under the Sales Act). 
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although the purchaser had not made known to the seller the exact 
use for which the article was desired. The court reasoned that since 
a stepladder is invariably purchased in order that a buyer may ele-
vate himself, this purpose is impliedly made known to a seller by 
the very nature of the article sold. 56 However, because the term "par-
ticular purpose" envisages a specific use peculiar to a certain 
buyer, 51 it would have been better for the court to speak in terms 
of a warranty of merchantability rather than finding an implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose just because the product 
had only one ordinary use.58 
The distinction benveen these two kinds of implied warranties 
becomes important under the Code only in determining the conse-
quences of a seller's attempt to disclaim the existence of either or 
both types in connection with a particular sale. In some circum-
stances section 2-316 requires that disclaimer of liability on a war-
ranty of merchantability, in order to be effective, must mention the 
term "merchantability." On the other hand, a· disclaimer of a war-
ranty of fitness for a particular purpose need not be cast in special 
language to be valid, although it must be in writing and con-
spicuous. 59 
3. Title 
Section 13 of the Uniform Sales Act provided that every sale of 
goods, as well as all contracts to sell goods, gave rise to three implied 
warranties of title: (1) that the vendor had a right to sell the goods, 
(2) that the buyer would enjoy quiet possession of them, and (3) 
that they were, or at the time of the sale would be, free from any 
charge or incumbrance in favor of third persons. 
The Code has abolished the concept of a specific warranty of 
quiet possession. An interference with a buyer's peaceful enjoyment 
of purchased goods is apparently intended under the Code to serve 
merely as evidence establishing a breach of a vendor's basic war-
ranty-that he had passed good title in connection with the sale.60 
More significant, while under the Sales Act the statute of limita-
tions on a cause of action for breach of a warranty of quiet possession 
began to run only when a buyer's possession was actually dis-
turbed, 61 the Code provides that a right to sue for a breach of any 
warranty relating to a seller's obligation to co~vey good title accrues 
56. Id. at 422, 187 N.E.2d at 310; accord, Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 
241, 382 P.2d 399 (1963) (recovery denied because of lack of privity). 
57. Davenport Ladder Co. v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 43 F.2d 63, 67 (8th Cir. 
1930); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 235 (1948 ed.). See also U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 2. 
58. Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 464, 162 A.2d 513, 515 
(1960). The court in Kirk found there had been no warranty of merchantability be-
cause the plaintiff had had an opportunity to inspect the ladder. 
59. See note 128 infra and accompanying text. 
60. U.C.C. § 2-312, comment I. 
61. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 221 (1948 ed.). 
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upon tender of delivery of merchandise, regardless of whether the 
aggrieved party then knew of the breach. 62 Coupled with the fact 
that the applicable statute of limitations may be reduced to a 
period as short as one year by agreement of the parties, 63 this rule 
will certainly promote finality in dealings involving commercial 
purchasers, the type of transactions with which the Code is pri-
marily concerned. 64 Nevertheless, it may prove unduly harsh to a 
consumer buyer who discovers too late that he has received stolen 
merchandise. 
While it retains the concept of a specific warranty against_ incum-
brances, the Code, in section 2-312(3), also provides that a seller im-
pliedly warrants that his goods will be taken free of any third per-
son's rightful claim for "infringement." However, this additional 
guarantee should be of little concern to an average consumer, be-
cause it apparently has reference to outstanding patent or trademark 
claims which could prevent a buyer from reselling merchandise.611 
II. THE CONCEPT OF PRIVITY 
A warranty is essentially a representation, either express or im-
plied, regarding the quality of, or title to, particular merchandise. 
It becomes a part of a sales agreement either because the parties to 
the transaction choose to incorporate it or because the law auto-
matically reads it into their contract.66 Since a warranty is thus an 
element of a contract, the prevailing rule is that a person may re-
cover for its breach only if he is actually privy to the agreement.07 
Therefore, a consumer purchasing from a retailer, who in turn re-
ceived the goods from their manufacturer, would be unable to sue 
the manufacturer for breach of any warranty, express or implied, 
arising out of the manufacturer's sale to the retailer. Nevertheless, 
many times a plaintiff wishes to sue a manufacturer or some member 
of a distributive chain besides his immediate seller, in order to reach 
the party most financially capable of compensating him for the losses 
he suffered by reason of a defect in a product. 
Before the industrial revolution, the privity concept was of little 
significance in the warranty context because a consumer usually 
bought a product directly from its manufacturer and was therefore 
in actual privity with the only party conceivably responsible for 
any injuries attributable to defective merchandise.68 In those rela-
tively few instances where a buyer purchased goods through a dealer, 
62. U.C.C. § 2-725(2); see U.C.C. § 2-312, comment 1. 
63. u.c.c. § 2-725(1). . 
64. See generally U.C.C. § 1-102. 
65. See U.C.C. § 2-312, comment 3. 
66. Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 84 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Tex, Civ, App. 1985), 
67. See 1 CORBIN, CoNTRACIS § 124 (1963 ed.); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 244 (1948 ed.). 
68. Ezer, supra note 38, at 322, 
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the latter was probably more affluent than the manufacturer and 
thus better able to bear any loss occasioned by a defective product.69 
However, when the marketing structure was revolutionized during 
the last century, it became increasingly necessary for a buyer injured 
by substandard merchandise to look beyond his immediate· seller 
(normally the neighborhood retailer) in order to find someone capa-
ble of adequately compensating him; the privity rule hindered his 
effort. Apart from traditional considerations of contract law and a 
desire to protect infant industries, 70 an important rationale for the 
continued vitality of the privity rule in breach of warranty actions 
was the feeling that a manufacturer who had made a representation 
to his buyer-a distributor or a retailer-had undertaken an obli-
gation to indemnify only that purchaser in case goods were not as 
represented. It was believed that a producer should not have the 
scope of his responsibility for such a representation enlarged, con-
trary to his wishes and expectations, to include a duty to compensate 
either injured subpurchasers of his buyer or other persons who 
might have been harmed by his merchandise.71 While this reasoning 
was based on the presumed intent of a contracting seller, it is difficult 
to reconcile with the fact that it has long been a common practice 
to impose warranties upon vendors by operation of law regardless 
of their wishes.72 Furthermore, today's manufacturer often expects 
that his goods will pass through a numb~r of hands before reaching 
an ultimate consumer, and thus has reason to anticipate that persons 
other than his immediate buyer could be injure~ by defective 
merchandise. 
A trend toward relaxation of the privity rule in actions for 
breach of warranty is apparent from a study of recent cases. Courts 
in increasing numbers are allowing an. injured consumer to go be-
yond his immediate seller and to recover damages from the manu-
facturer or other persons in the distributive chain through which 
the offending merchandise passed. 
Apart from the bond of actual privity of contract existing be-
tween a buyer of goods and his immediate seller; there are three 
other possible categories of relationships between or among poten-
tial parties to a products liability suit. For convenience these may 
be denoted by the terms vertical, horizontal, and diagonal privity, 
although frequently the individuals whose interrelation is desig-
69. Ibid. 
70. See note 2 supra. 
71. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 244 (1948 ed.), . . 
72. Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); Hawkins 
v. Pemberton, 51 N.Y. 198, 10 Am. Rep. 595 (1872); Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 Utah 
180, 166 P.2d 536 (1946). But see Wallace v. McCampbell, 178 Tenn. 224, 156 S.W.2d 
442 (1941). U.C.C. § 2-313(2) provides that a seller need not have a "specific intention 
to make a warranty." 
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nated by the use of one of these labels are in no semblance of actual 
privity with each other. The following chart illustrates the applica-
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i :}DISTRIBUTOR \~ 
] I Actual privity) ,oi 
,... \ i .. ....... I .,. 
\~. I DEALER ?· :l ,~ 
lr"'™ pdvity) _______ \_, _______ _ 
RETAILER (Actual 
(Seller) privity) 
CONSUMER FAMILY, FRIENDS, OTHERS 
(Buyer) - - - - - (H~°iz;;';;ta\ privity) -
A. Vertical Privity 
The concept of vertical privity deals with the relationship be-
nveen parties to a transaction occurring in the course of product 
distribution prior to a sale to an ultimate purchaser and is therefore 
not important in the context of a discussion of consumer protec-
tion.74 Indeed, privity is not a significant issue in most cases brought 
by one member of the distributive chain against another, because 
the litigants are normally in actual privity. This situation may be 
attributable to the fact that transactions before a final sale are regu-
larly completed on the basis of contracts providing adequate relief 
for an immediate buyer in case a warranty is breached by his imme-
diate seller. In any event, it appears that the current disposition toward 
relaxing the traditional application of the privity rule has carried 
over into litigation involving parties in the distributive process. 
73. This chart is a modified version of the one appearing in Ezer, supra note 38, 
at 323. 
74. See, e.g., Southwest Ice &: Dairy Prods. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 278 Okla, 278, 220 
P .2d 257 (1950). 
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In Free v. Sluss, 75 for example, a retailer was allowed to recover 
from the manufacturer of a quantity of unmarketable soap for 
breach of an express warranty, although the goods had been sold to 
the plaintiff by an intermediate dealer. The court held that the 
manufacturer's quality guarantee printed on each package of soap 
had been addressed to anyone who would deal with the product in 
the "usual channels of trade."76 In this regard, an explanatory com-
ment to one Code provision suggests that the draftsmen were neu-
tral on the question of abrogating the requirement of actual privity 
in cases benveen parties in a vertical relationship.77 
B. Horizontal Privity 
Code section 2-318 deals with the concept of horizontal privity, 
for it relates to the situation where a non-purchaser injured by the 
defective product seeks compensation from the final seller of the 
product: 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to 
any natural person who is in the family or household of his 
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect 
that such a person may use, consume or be affected by the goods 
and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller 
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section. 
This provision makes specified persons-members of a buyer's fam-
ily and household, as well as guests in his home-third-party bene-
ficiaries of all warranties running from a final seller to his purchaser, 
unless it can be shown that the vendor could not have anticipated 
that these persons would be affected by a particular product. Of 
course, whether the enactment of section 2-318 in a given state 
has meant the expansion of a vendor's liability depends upon the 
status of the pre-Code authority in the jurisdiction. While the law 
of many states did allow members of a buyer's family and household 
to reap the benefit of a seller's warranty to an actual purchaser, this 
liberality was generally manifested only in cases where a plaintiff's 
injury had been caused by impure food or by a defect in an "immi-
nently dangerous" product.78 By making section 2-318 applicable in 
actions arising from injuries caused by almost any type of defective 
merchandise, the Code has afforded greater consumer protection in 
these jurisdictions. On the other hand, where the privity rule ap-
pears to have been abolished or where recovery for product-related 
75. 87 Cal. App. 2d 933, 197 P.2d 854 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct. 1948). 
76. Id. at 937, 197 P.2d at 856; accord, U.S. Pipe &: Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, 
130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 432, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937). 
77. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3. 
78. Torpey v. Red Owl Stores, 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); I WILLISTON, SALES 
§ 244 (1948 ed.); see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). 
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injuries can be based on a theory of strict liability in tort, this pro-
vision is of less significance.79 
Because many products are bought at least partially for the use 
or enjoyment of the persons described in section 2-318, there is good 
reason to confer upon them the advantages of a buyer's warranty 
protection. However, a purchaser often buys a product for the bene-
fit of others standing in special relationships to him. These indi-
viduals, including a buyer's employees and guests in his automobile, 
are not· explicitly protected by the Code, with the result that its 
draftsmen may well be criticized for their somewhat arbitrary stipu-
lation in this provision of the classes of persons who are deemed to 
stand in the shoes of a buyer. The problem which section 2-318 in 
its present £onµ. fails to solve is perhaps best illustrated by the situ-
ation in which a purchaser's employee is injured by defective mer-
chandise·bought for the employee's occupational use. The California 
Supreme Court, in the pre-Code case of Peterson v. Lamb Rubber 
Co.,80 held that such an employee stood in the shoes of his employer 
and thus could recover on a warranty theory from his employer's 
seller, despite the lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant. 
The court suggested in dicta that its decision might have been the 
same had section 2-318 been in effect at the time of the accident, for 
the workman could be termed a member of his employer's "indus-
trial family" and thus made one of the third-party beneficiaries 
expressly protected by this provision.81 However, a court in Penn-
sylvania, the first state to adopt the Code, specifically refused to con• 
strue section 2-318 to include a purchaser's employee.82 Unless it can 
fairly be said that. injured employees are adequately protected by 
workmen's compensation legislation, there seems to be no reason to 
discriminate against them as the Code thus appears to do.83 
79. Section 2·318 was omitted entirely from the version of the Uniform Commer• 
cial Code enacted in California. It is interesting to note that the California Supreme 
Court has adopted the theory of a seller's strict liability for injuries caused by a 
defective product. See generally Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of 
Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1350 (1966). 
80. 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960). 
81. Id. at 347, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 869, 353 P.2d at 581. After Peterson, the Uniform 
Commercial Code, with § 2-318 deleted, was adopted in California. See generally note 
79 supra and accompanying text. In Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 
N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964), on facts very similar to those in Peterson the court 
assumed that an employee of the purchaser could maintain an action for breach of 
implied warranty, but the trial court's dismissal was affirmed because of a lack of 
evidence showing that the product in question had been defective. 
82. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), A recent 
case suggests a change in attitude on the part of the Pennsylvania courts. Nederostek 
v. Endicott-Johnson Shoe Co., 415 Pa. 136, ,202 A.2d 72 (1964) (employee not neccs• 
sarily excluded from warranty protection where "supplied" with shoes purchased by 
his employer). 
83. Two pre-Code cases which have allowed the employee the benefit of a warranty 
made to his employer are: Hart v. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp, 817 
(N.D. Ind. 1963); Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1963), 
"There is no doubt that the doctrine of privity will be extended, sooner or later, to 
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Actually, section 2-318 represents a retreat from the position 
espoused by the authors of the 1949 draft of the Code in which they 
promulgated a version of this provision which would have extended 
the benefit of a seller's warranty to anyone "whose relationship to 
[a buyer] is such as to make it reasonable to expect that such person 
may use, consume, or be affected by the goods purchased,"84 and thus 
would have displaced the privity requirement in a warranty action. 
The Colorado and Wyoming legislatures decided that a requirement 
of privity would serve no useful purpose in their states, and, therefore, 
in enacting the Code substituted for section 2-318 a provision ex-
tending a seller's warranty to "any person who may reasonably be 
expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods."85 In Virginia, 
section 2-318 has been supplanted by an "anti-privity" statute con-
taining language equivalent to that of the Colorado and Wyoming 
provisions. 86 
In fairness to the draftsmen of the current version of the Code, 
it should be noted that the explanatory comment accompanying 
section 2-318 suggests that this provision was intended to be neutral 
on the question of the application and extension of that pre-Code 
case law by which the benefit of a seller's warranty had been con-
ferred upon persons who are not specifically covered by this section.87 
However, when by enacting the Code in its present form a legis-
lature has said that a warranty recovery may be had by members of 
a consumer's family and household and guests in his home, a court 
may rely on the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius and 
be reluctant to take its cue from the comment and to extend war-
ranty protection further.88 
include employees of a purchaser. There is no good reason why it should not he so 
extended now." Id. at 441, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 140. But see :Barlow v. DeVilbiss Co., 214 
F. Supp. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1963); Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co., 79 Nev. 241, 382 P.2d 
399 (1963). 
84. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1949 Draft). In 1950, a proposal was made to amend the official 
comment to section 2-318 of the 1949 Draft to make it clear that the section extended 
a buyer's warranty protection to his employees. However, in order to minimize objec-
tion to enactment of the Code not only was this suggestion rejected; but section 2-318 
was amended to its present form. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3 (Proposed Final Draft 
1950). 
85. Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-318 (Supp. 1965); Colo. Laws. 1965, § 155-2-318. 
86. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965); see Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Stat-
ute: Strict Products Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. R.Ev. 
814 (1965). Alabama has deleted the words "who is in the family or household of the 
buyer or who is a guest in his home" from its version of § 2-318 which will be effec-
tive January 1, 1967. UNIFORM LAws ANN., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (Supp. 
1965, at 61). California and Utah deleted § 2-318 entirely. CAL. COMM, CODE § 2-318; 
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 70A (1953). 
87, U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3 states: "This section expressly includes as benefi-
ciaries within its provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. :Be-
yond this, the section is neutral arid is not intended to enlarge or restrict the develop-
ing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend 
to other persons in the distributive chain." 
88. See Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (not extended to 
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An interesting problem of interpretation is presented by the use 
of the word "family" in section 2-318 without explanation or quali-
fication. The employment of this term in conjunction with the word 
"household" and the phrase "guest in [the buyer's] home" suggests 
that it may have been intended to connote an immediate family 
group, including only relatives living in the same household. A 
Pennsylvania court in Miller v. Preitz.80 seemed to sanction this in-
terpretation when it denied the benefit of section 2-318 to a buyer's 
nephew living next door. On the other hand, as noted above, the 
California Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to construe the 
word "family" broadly enough to include employees of a purchaser, 
on the ground that they are members of his "industrial" family.00 
Until recently, courts which even before the enactment of section 
2-318 freely extended warranty coverage horizontally to include 
members of the family of a buyer of a defective product, his guests, 
and even his employees, refused to go so far as to give similar pro-
tection to persons more remotely associated with a purchaser-so-
called bystanders.91 Early in 1963, however, a Connecticut court 
in Connolly v. Hagi92 allowed a gasoline station attendant to bring 
a warranty action against the manufacturer of an automobile which 
had rolled over the plaintiff while he was servicing it. ·Pointing out 
that the attendant had alleged that he had undertaken to work upon 
the car in reliance upon defendant's extensive advertising claims 
that the vehicle was safe, the court decided that it would be "unreal-
istic to protect the wife of the purchaser, his guest in the car, but 
not the mechanic to whom he brings the car for purposes of service 
guest in buyer's automobile); Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 18'7 A,2d 
5'15 (1963) (not extended to employee of purchaser); Miller v. Preitz, 14 Bucks Co. L,R, 
1 (Pa. C.P. 1964) (not extended to purchaser's nephew living next door). But see 
Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark. 1964) where, after pointing 
out that in certain instances the defense of privity of contract had been abolished 
by section 2-318, the court said that it could see "no sound reason why the employee 
or servant of a purchaser using the product in the course of employment as directed, 
should be barred from suing on the warranty because of any shield of privily," 
383 S.W.2d at 893; The version of § 2-318 found in the Texas Code provides: 
This Article does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take advan-
tage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or whether 
the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to the buyer 
may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the 
quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their determination, 
2 Texas General & Special Laws 1965, ch, '121, at 26 (effective June 30, 1966). 
89. 14 Bucks Co. L.R. 1 (Pa. C.P. 1964). 
90. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 5'15 
(1960). See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
91. Rodriguez v. Shell's City, Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (Fla. App. 1962); Hahn v. Ford 
Motor Co., 256 Iowa 2'1, 126 N.W.2d 350 (1964); Berzon v. Don Allen Motors, 23 App, 
Div. 2d 530, 256 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1965). 
92. 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963). Since this case involved a 
suit by a bystander against a manufacturer, it is also relevant to a discussion of 
diagonal privity. 
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in connection with its operation. "93 Nevertheless, even in this juris-
diction there is some limitation on a warrantor's responsibility. In 
Kuschy v. Norris,94 decided a year later, another Connecticut court 
denied a warranty recovery against a used-car dealer who had sold 
an automobile which had collided with plaintiff's car on a public· 
highway, allegedly because of defective brakes. As the court ob-
served, the plaintiff was merely a member of the general public and 
not "a person who, in the contemplation of the parties to the con-
tract, might be expected to use, occupy or service the used auto-
mobile."95 It should be noted that the courts in both Hagi and 
Norris determined that the right to warranty recovery depended 
upon the nature of a plaintiff's association with an injurious product 
rather than upon his relation to its buyer-the factor apparently 
considered more significant by the authors of Code section 2-318. 
The recent Michigan case of Piercefield v. Remington Arms 
Company96 seems to have made a new departure under the Sales Act 
by extending implied warranty protection to a person no more 
closely connected with a purchaser of offending merchandise than was. 
the plaintiff in Norris. The plaintiff in Piercefield was injured when 
the barrel of a shotgun fired by his brother exploded, apparently 
because of a defective shell. Although the ammunition had been 
purchased by the victim's brother, the court held that the plaintiff 
could maintain a warranty action against the retailer, wholesaler, 
and manufacturer. of the cartridge. Without defining the possible 
limits of warranty coverage, the court merely said that, upon 
proof of an injury-causing defect attributable to the manufacturer 
of the product, recovery could not be defeated by a defense of lack 
of privity.97 Actually, since the purchaser in Piercefield could prob-
ably be considered a member of plaintiff's "family" within the 
meaning of section 2-318, plaintiff might have been a third-party 
beneficiary under that section had the Code been in effect at the 
time of the accident.98 However, the court indicated that the plain-
tiff had not pleaded his relationship to the buyer and made it clear 
93. Id. at 206, 188 A.2d at 887. The court relied on the New Jersey case of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), as authority for 
the proposition that a guest in the buyer's automobile may recover in a breach of 
warranty action. The U.C.C. does not expresssly adopt this view. See generally text 
following note 79 supra. 
94. 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (Super. Ct. 1964). 
95. Id. at 385, 206 A.2d at 276. 
96. 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). 
97. Id. at 99, 133 N.W.2d at 135. 
98. See generally text following note 88 supra. The Uniform Commercial Code 
went into effect in Michigan on January 1, 1964; however, the events from which 
Piercefield arose occurred before that date and were therefore governed by the Uni-
form Sales Act then in effect. 
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that it would have extended the benefit of the seller's warranty 
regardless of the latter's relation to the ultimate purchaser.00 
The Colorado, Virginia, and Wyoming anti-privity statutes men-
tioned above would appear to be authority in those states for ex-
panding warranty coverage to include many bystanders.100 Unlike 
section 2-318, these statutes make no mention of a plaintiff's relation 
to an ultimate purchaser as a basis for recovery, but require only 
that a victim be one who may reasonably have been expected to use, 
consume, or be affected by the goods. Although the construction of 
these provisions has not yet been settled, their language would seem 
to encompass the service station attendant in Hagi, the plaintiff in 
Piercefield, and possibly even the motorist on the public highway 
who was denied relief in Norris. 
C. Diagonal Privity 
The question whether a party can recover on a warranty theory 
from one with whom his relationship can be characterized by the 
term "diagonal privity" is crucial when a plaintiff (usually a buyer) 
injured by a defective product seeks compensation from the manu-
facturer or from someone else in the distributive chain ahead of the 
final seller. , 
Courts have invoked a number of fictions in order to avoid the 
sometimes harsh effect which would have resulted from the tradi-
tional application of the privity rule in diagoncll privity cases.101 
Some have held a manufacturer liable on an express warranty theory 
on the basis of representations found in his consumer-oriented 
advertising or on his product labels, just as if the statements con-
veyed through these media had been made by him to an ultimate 
consumer in a face-to-face transaction.102 Others have allowed a 
plaintiff to by-pass a retailer and sue a manufacturer of a defective 
product on the theory that the retailer was either an agent of the 
manufacturer or a mere conduit for the goods.103 Other courts allow 
a person on the consumer level to recover on the basis of implied 
warranties arising from transactions between parties in the distribu-
tive chain. Some have done this by making exceptions to the strict 
application of the privity requirement on behalf of persons injured 
by unwholesome food, drugs, and, in some cases, defects in so-called 
imminently dangerous products.104 A few courts, such as those which 
99. 375 Mich. 85, 99, 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1965). 
100. See text accompanying notes 85 and 86 supra. 
101. See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 158-54 (1957): 
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, li6·63 
(1963). 
102. See cases cited note 27 supra. 
103. Rogers v. U.S. Rubber Co., 91 N.H. 398, 20 A.2d 626 (1941); General Motors 
Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960). 
104. l WILLisrON, SALES § 244 (1948 ed.). 
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decided Hagi and Piercefield, have gone so far as to say that a buyer 
no longer need be in actual privity with a defendant in the distrib-
utive chain in order to recover for the breach of a warranty accom-
panying the sale of any kind of merchandise.106 
The Second Restatement of Torts suggests that in cases where 
the exceptions have swallowed the rule to the extent described 
above, the theory has changed from one of contractual warranty to 
one of strict liability in tort.106 However, the important issue is not 
what theory should be used to explain the demise of the privity 
requirement, but rather the extent to which liability should be im-
posed on the seller of defective merchandise. , 
Since the language of Code section 2-318 deals with a seller's 
liability to persons in certain relationships to his buyer, it appeai:s 
that this provision is, by its terms, of assistance to those persons 
only when they sue a buyer's immediate seller-in the usual situ-
ation, a retailer. Therefore, this provision is relevant only in an 
action between parties :whose relationship can best be described by 
the term "horizontal privity." However, the explanatpry comment 
to section 2-318 suggests that the Code's authors did not intend the 
provision either to enlarge or to restrict the developing case law 
with respect to diagonal privity.107 Nevertheless, another Code sec-
tion actually appears to have the effect of preventing a court from 
finding fictional privity in a suit by an ultimate consumer against 
a manufacturer on the basis of representations appearing in his 
advertising. Section 2-313(l)(a) states that an express warranty arises 
105. See text following notes 92 and 96 supra. See also Vandercook &: Son, Inc. v. 
Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965), where the court observed: ''We now conclude 
that under Florida law a manufacturer, as distinguished from the retailer of a prod-
uct, may be held liable for breach of the implied warranty that the product manu-
factured is reasonably fit for the purposes intended without regard to whether the 
plaintiff is in privity of contract." Id. at 931. 
It is interesting to note that most of the recent decisions doing away with the 
requirement of privity in warranty actions have been made by federal courts on the 
basis of "Erie-educated" guesses regarding the status of the law in a particular state. 
See Vandercook & Son, Inc. v. Thorpe, supra (Florida); Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber 
Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965) (Indiana); Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 
911 (5th Cir. 1964) (Texas); Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1~63) 
(Vermont); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff d, 304 F.2d 149 
(9th Cir. 1962) (Hawaii). 
106. 2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965); see Comment, 
Products Liability-The Expansion of fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort Liability, 
64 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1369 (1966). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 
Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 910 (1963) (Traynor, J.): 
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory 
of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plain-
tiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recog-
nition that the liability is not assumed by agieement but imposed by law, and 
the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of, its own responsi-
bility for defective products makes clear that the liability is not one governed by 
the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. 
107. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 3. 
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from an affirmation of fact made by the seller to the buyer, and 
thereby suggests that a consumer may not have the benefit of a manu-
facturer's express warranty unless the consumer purchased from the 
manufacturer. Nevertheless, the comment to section 2-313 also indi-
cates that the quoted language was "not designed in any way to 
disturb those lines of case law growth which have recognized that 
warranties need not be confined . . . to the direct parties to such a 
contract."108 Thus interpreted, section 2-313 would appear not to 
reduce the warranty protection available under the Sales Act, which 
authorized a court to find an express warranty in any affirmative 
statement made by a seller concerning his goods.100 
III. DISCLAIMERS 
Although the general trend in recent years has been toward 
affording the protection of a manufacturer's or other seller's war-
ranty to an increasing number of persons, it has nonetheless re-
mained possible for a warrantor to limit the nature and the extent 
of his warranty obligation.11° The policy favoring the practice of 
giving effect to a clause modifying the terms of a warranty or alto-
gether disclaiming any warranty liability which might otherwise be 
imposed has traditionally been based on the concept of freedom of 
contract-the right of parties to set the terms of their bargain as 
they see fit and to have their agreement upheld in court.111 Recently, 
however, a growing number of courts have come to recognize that, 
in our contemporary marketing system, a writing which evidences 
a sale and purports to contain a valid disclaimer or modification 
clause is often not the result of actual bargaining between the 
parties. Thus, in the leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc.,112 the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to recognize 
the validity of a disclaimer provision found in the then standard 
automotive sales contract, on the ground that the "grossly dispropor-
tionate bargaining power" of the automobile manufacturer, acting 
through its local dealer, gave the ordinary buyer no real choice but 
to accept any limitations on liability laid down by the seller.118 
108. U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2, 
109. U.S.A. § 12. 
110, See Duesenberg, Manufacturer's Last Stand: The Disclaimer, 20 Bus. LAW, 159 
(1964); 77 HARV. L. REv. 318 (1963). U.S.A. § 71 provided: "Where any right, duty or 
liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may 
be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between 
the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the 
contract or the sale." 
111. Payne v. Valley Motor Sales, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 622, 628 (W, Va. 1962), 
112. 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 96 (1960). For a criticism of the case, see Bosh• 
koff, Some Thoughts About Physical Harm, Disclaimers and Warranties, 4 B.C. IND, &: 
CoM. L. REv. 285, 305-06 (1963). 
113. 32 N.J. at 374, 161 A.2d at 78; accord, State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co. v. 
Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Jarnot v. Ford Motor 
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Similar, albeit often unexpressed, concern with the imbalance in-
herent in other transactions was no doubt responsible for the many 
pre-Code cases indicating a judicial willingness to scrutinize dis-
claimer and modification clauses closely and to construe them 
strictly.114 In several such cases, a carefully drafted contract provision 
was found ineffective on the ground that its language was insuffi-
cient to accomplish its intended purpose,115 because it had been 
"unfairly procured,"116 or, in the case of a disclaimer, because the 
result of enforcing it would have amounted to a failure of the con-
sideration supporting the sales contract of which it was a part.117 
While the authors of the Uniform Commercial Code endorsed 
the long-standing policy favoring freedom of contract, they at the 
same time approved thaf case law holding invalid unconscionable 
contract terms.118 Section 2-302 states: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time 
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or 
it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the un-
conscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
This provision, apparently designed to prevent "oppression and 
unfair surprise,''119 might have been considered a sufficient limita-
tion on a seller's power to incorporate a disclaimer or modification 
clause into a sales agreement. However, because the unconsciona-
bility test is a vague guideline at best, the Code's draftsmen felt that 
the standards to be applied in determining the validity of such a 
contract term should be expressly set out, as they are in section 
2-316.120 According to the accompanying comment, the purpose of 
Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). See generally Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Con-
tracts in the Conflicts of Laws, 53 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1072 (1953); Kessler, Contracts of 
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 629 (1943). 
114. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 385-406, 161 A.2d 69, 
84-96 (1960). 
115. See Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951); McPeak 
v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 
N.W. 790 (1927). 
116. See International Harvester Co. v. Beam, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S.W. 549 (Ct. App. 
1914); Davis Motors, Dodge &: Plymouth Co. v. Avett, 294 S.W .2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1956). 
117. See Myers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W.2d 988 (1950). 
118. As long ago as Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1870), the 
Court observed that "if a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void 
for fraud, a court of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not 
according to its letter, but only such as he is equitably entitled to." 
119. See U.C.C. § 2-302, comment I. See also Comment, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 401, 421 
(1961): "Section 2-302 evidences a realization that a contract is not a signature affixed 
to a long printed form but rather a mutual understanding reached through a process 
of bargaining." 
120. "The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background 
and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so 
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this provision, like that of section 2-302, is not to prevent a seller 
from employing a disclaimer or a modification clause, but rather to 
protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained-for provisions.121 
In regard to a seller's a,ttempt to vary the terms of an express war-
ranty or to disclaim express warranty liability, section 2-316(1) pro-
vides that "words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty 
shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; 
but ... negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such 
construction is unreasonable." 
Since the original proposed draft of this subsection had said 
simply that "if the sales agreement creates an express warranty, 
words disclaiming it are inoperative,"122 the change to the present 
version has been criticized for diluting consumer protection.123 
Actually, the current language is rooted in the case law which devel-
oped while the Sales Act was in effect. Some courts regularly held 
that if an attempted disclaimer of express warranty liability pro-
duced a conflict bet\veen t\V'O terms of a sales contract, the conflict 
should be resolved by refusing to enforce the disclaimer and by 
giving full effect to the term creating the warranty.124 Furthermore, 
if, as the accompanying explanatory comment suggests, the presence 
of a disclaimer or modification clause may be evidence concerning 
the existence, nature, and extent of an express warranty, the present 
language of section· 2-316(1) merely gives vitality to the principle 
that express warranties rest on the "dickered" aspects of an indi-
vidual bargain.125 
Once an affirmation of fact or a promise has been made, and is 
of a type normally creating an express warranty, it is very difficult, 
even under the present section 2-316(1), for the warrantor to restrict 
the effect of his representation. I£ the language of a disclaimer or 
modification cannot be reconciled with the terms of the warranty, 
the disclaimer or modification will be rejected. Furthermore, be-
cause the Code has made the warranty of description an express 
warranty, a general disclaimer of all warranty liability is impossible; 
if such a disclaimer could be fully effective in the face of represen-
tations describing the merchandise which became the subject matter 
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of 
the making of the contract." U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1, 
121. U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 1. 
122. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1952 ed.). 
123. Cudahy, Limitations of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 
MARQ. L. REv. 127, 131 (1963); Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on 
the California Law of Sales, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 281, 310 (1961). 
124. See, e.g., Fairbanks, Morse &: Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d 817 
(3d Cir. 1951). 
125. Hawkland, Limitations of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
11 HowARD L.J. 28 (1965). See generally U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 1, 
May 1966] Sales Warranties 1455 
of a bargain, the seller would be under no obligation to deliver 
conforming goods.126 
With careful planning, a seller can protect himself to some ex-
tent from undesired express warranty liability by employing a writ-
ten contract intended by the parties to be a final expression of their 
agreement. In this way, he can preclude the admission of evidence 
showing that an express warranty arose from representations not 
contained in the contract.127 However, it is often impractical to re-
duce a sales agreement to writing and frequently difficult to con-
vince a court sympathetic to a buyer that a purchaser actually in-
tended even a written contract to contain all the terms of a bargain 
when some of a seller's affirmations or promises were not included 
in the document. Therefore, it is advisable for a seller to make no 
representations in his advertising and sales talk that he is unwilling 
to warrant as true. 
Liability arising from implied warranties of merchantability 
and fitness for a particular purpose can be disclaimed, and the ordi-
nary terms of these warranties can be varied, by a seller who complies 
with the provisions of Code section 2-316(2): 
Subject to subsection (3) [discussed below], to e~clude or 
modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part 
of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of 
a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any 
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be in writing 
and conspicuous.128 · 
Section 2-316(2) is an expression of the Code's liberal policy of 
allowing a seller to define the nature and scope of any obligation 
which he plans to assume, so long as his buyer is aware of the extent 
of the seller's intended responsibility.129 By providing that all writ-
ten disclaimer and modification clauses must be conspicuous in or-
der to be effective, this section prevents a seller from disclaiming 
warranty liability and from varying the terms of a warranty by add-
ing a "fine print" clause at the bottom of a contract. The Code 
defines a "conspicuous" contract term as one which "is so ·written 
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have 
noticed it," and, more specifically, indicates that language in the 
body of a form is "conspicuous" only if it appears in a type style 
·or a color causing it to stand out from other printed matter.180 The 
requirement that written disclaimers 9r modification provisions 
126. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 4; text accompanying note 21 supra. 
127. See U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 2; Duesenberg, supra note BO, at 163. 
128. This section is said to have been drafted on. the assumption that the implied 
warranties exist unless excluded or modified. See U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 5. 
129. HAWKLAND, 'TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ']6 
(1964). 
130. u.c.c. § 1-201(10). 
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must be conspicuous should be of significant aid to the average 
consumer, who has neither the interest to read nor the sophistication 
to understand a sometimes lengthy and technical sales contract. 
With the exception of section 2-318, the Code does not expressly 
deal with the case where a party brings a warranty action against 
a member of a distributive chain with whom he is not in actual 
privity of contract.131 An interesting question is whether a manu-
facturer who included an operative warranty disclaimer or modifi-
cation clause in a contract with his immediate buyer, such as a 
wholesaler, is liable to a subpurchaser, user, or bystander with 
whom he is not in privity where, but for the potential effect of the 
clause, he would clearly be responsible under local law on a war-
ranty theory irrespective of the lack of privity. It could be argued 
that if the privity rule is inapplicable in a particular instance, dis-
claimers as well as warranties extend beyond the immediate parties 
to the sale. This is the theory apparently intended to be employed 
in connection with section 2-318, which makes a buyer's family, 
household, and guests third-party beneficiaries of a warranty re-
ceived by the buyer from his immediate seller. These beneficiaries 
are said to be bound by the same disclaimers and modifications as 
is the buyer himself.182 However, allowing a disclaimer to be bind-
ing on all subpurchasers, users, and bystanders raises the specter 
that a manufacturer could insulate himself from all warranty lia-
bility simply by establishing a corporation to serve as a distributor 
and then effectively disclaiming warranty responsibility in connec-
tion with each sale to the subsidiary. If a manufacturer could thus 
disclaim warranty liability to all subpurchasers and users of his 
product, an important reason for relaxing the privity requirement 
in warranty actions-finding a more financially responsible defen-
dant-would be lost.188 For this reason, it is doubtful that many 
courts will be inclined to reach a strictly logical result when called 
upon to determine the validity of a manufacturer's disclaimer in a 
diagonal privity context. It should be noted, however, that section 
2-316 does not require even a ·written disclaimer or a modification 
to be set out in a formal contract, and thus suggests the possibility 
that a manufacturer may disclaim warranty liability both to his im-
mediate buyer and to other subpurchasers by means of statements 
on the labels of his merchandise or on the packages containing his 
goods. 
Section 2-316(3) provides basically that, irrespective of a seller's 
use of particular words, an implied warranty is automatically ex-
131. U.C.C. § 2-818, comment 8. Section 2-818 is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 78-90 supra. 
132. U.C.C. § 2-318, comment I. 
133. See text accompanying note 69 supra. 
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eluded from a sales agreement, or modified with respect to its terms, 
where the circumstances of a transaction would lead a reasonable 
buyer to expect such an exclusion or modification. By way of illus-
tration, the Code suggests that a vendor's use of an expression like 
"as is" or "with all faults" is sufficient to disclaim all implied war-
ranty liability unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.134 How-
ever, since these expressions are supposed to "call the buyer's atten-
tion" to the fact that no implied warranties exist, it seems that if 
they are in ·writing, they, too, must be conspicuous.135 It would also 
appear that unawareness on the part of a particular buyer, such as 
a consumer, of the intended significance of an expression would be 
a circumstance indicating that a seller's use of the words was ineffec-
tive to disclaim liability. Furthermore, when a buyer has examined 
goods prior to sale, or when he has refused to take advantage of the 
opportunity to inspect them, there is no implied warranty against 
the presence in the merchandise of defects which ought to have 
been discovered during the course of an examination undertaken 
by one in the buyer's position.136 Because the draftsmen apparently 
intended that a purchaser's knowledge and commercial experience 
as well as the circumstances of the sale should be taken into account 
in considering the effect of his inspection or failure to inspect, it is 
unlikely that a consumer buyer will often lose the benefit of an 
implied warranty by virtue of his having had an opportunity to. 
examine merchandise.137 
Section 2-719, allowing parties to modify the ordinary remedies 
for breach of contract, permits any conscionable limitation of conse-
quential damages arising from a breach of warranty, but states that 
a limitation on consequential damages for personal injury is prima 
fade unconscionable.138 It has thus been suggested that the absence 
of any reference to the notion of conscionability in section 2-316 
may imply that by incorporating an effective disclaimer, a seller can 
automatically preclude liability for personal injury.139 However, this 
134. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a); Schneider v. ,Swaney Motor Car Co., 136 N.W.2d 338 
(Iowa 1965) (no warranty where used cars were purchased on "as is" and "where is" 
basis); see Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964) (language 
used to disclaim held ineffective); Yanish v. Femandiz, 397 P .2d 881 (Colo. 1965); 
Lafayette Highway Equip. Sales & Serv. v. Dixie Truck & Equip. Serv., 179 So. 2d 479 
(La. App. 1965) (language effective); James Talcott, Inc. v. Finley, 389 P.2d 988 (Okla. 
1964). "To be effective • • • the disclaimer must call to the attention of the buyer 
by clear announcement that the manufacturer and seller reject the implied warranty 
which the law raises as an incident to the contract of sale. In effect, it must make 
plain that there is no warranty that their product is reasonably suited for use as an 
automobile." Willman v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Co. L.J. 51, 56 {Pa. C.P. 
1961). 
135. See U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a). 
136. u.c.c. § 2-316(3)(b). . 
137. See U.C.C. § 2-316, comment 8. 
138. U.C.C. § 2-719(3). See text accompanying note 146 infra. 
139. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under 
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argument ignores the fact that section 2-302, dealing with uncon-
scionable contract_ terms, is not limited in application to questions 
arising under those Code sections in which it is specifically men-
tioned, but may be used to void any unconscionable contract clause. 
Furthermore, by declaring that a limitation on consequential dam-
ages for personal injury is prima fade unconscionable, section 2-719 
should give content to section 2-302 when the latter provision is used 
to test the validity of a warranty disclaimer. 
IV. LIMITATION OF REMEDY 
Code section 2-714(1), treating in a general way the remedies 
for any breach of contract for the sale of goods where the breach is 
discovered after merchandise has been accepted by a buyer, provides 
that a purchaser may recover damages for all losses resulting in the 
ordinary course of events from the infraction. Section 2-714(2) speci-
fies that the basic measure of damages for breach of warranty is the 
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of 
the goods in the condition in which they were accepted and the 
value that they would have had if they had been as warranted. More 
important, section 2-714(3) provides that compensation for inciden-
tal and consequential damage may also be recovered;140 consequen-
tial damage includes "injuries to persons or property proximately 
resulting from any breach of warranty."141 These Code provisions 
were derived without significant change from the Uniform Sales 
Act.142 
On the other hand, Code section 2-316(4) states that where war-
ranty liability has not been disclaimed, the remedies for breach of 
an express or an implied warranty may be limited by agreement of 
the contracting parties in accordance with sections 2-718 and 2-719. 
Section 2-718 allows the parties to establish a provision in a sales 
agreement for reasonable liquidated damages, so long as the amount 
payable upon breach is not so large as to constitute a penalty. The 
reasonableness of a sum stipulated as liquidated damages is deter-
mined in the light of either the harm which could have been antici-
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 282 
(1963). 
140. The elements of incidental and consequential damages are described in U.C.C, 
§ 2-715. 
141. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(b). The term "proximately resulting" is not defined in the 
Code. However, according to an official comment, if a buyer has discovered a defect 
or used a product without making a reasonable inspection, a product-related injury 
could be said not to have proximately resulted from a breach of warranty. U.C.C. 
§ 2-715, comment 5. 
142. See generally U.S.A. §§ 69(6)-(7). Other remedies for breach of a sales 
contract are found in U.C.C. §§ 2-711, -713, -717. See HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 
129, _at 229-309. Fqr criticism of the contract remedies provided by the U.C.C., includ-
ing those for breach of warranty, see Peters, supra note 139. 
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pated, at the time of contracting, to result from a breach, or the 
harm which did in fact occur. Other factors to be taken into con-
sideration by a court are the difficulty of proving the amount of the 
loss and the inconvenience of obtaining an adequate remedy if the 
liquidated-damage clause is not enforced.143 These are essentially 
the same factors that have always been taken into account by courts 
in ruling on the validity of liquidated-damage clauses, although in 
the past some courts were reluctant to consider the actual loss attrib-
utable to a breach of contract.144 By expressly providing that a,court 
may consider the actual-harm factor as well as the possibility that 
a particular stipulated damage clause is void as unconscionable un-
der section 2-302, the Code's draftsmen sought to ensure that section 
2-718 would not be used to sanction a liquidated damage clause 
which unfairly favored either party. 
By virtue of section 2-719, the parties to a sale may agree upon 
warranty remedies in addition to, or in place of, those specifi-
cally provided by the Code. Similarly, they may alter the normal 
measure of damages for a breach of warranty. Thus, they may 
agree that a seller can satisfy any warranty liability to a buyer by 
repairing or replacing defective merchandise.145 Section 2-719 also 
permits any conscionable limitation or exclusion of consequential 
damages arising from a breach of warranty but, as noted earlier, 
explicitly states that the "limitation of consequential damages for 
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima fade 
unconscionable. "146 
A possi~le anomaly in the application of sections 2-718(3) and 
2-719 arises from the fact that neither provision indicates that a 
written contract clause modifying or limiting a remedy need be con-
spicuous, as must its counterpart disclaiming warranty liability or 
modifying the terms of a warranty.147 Thus, these provisions do not 
seem to go as far as would be desirable in protecting a buyer, par-
ticularly a consumer, from unexpected limitations upon a seller's 
liability. Of course, any potential unfairness which may result from 
the draftsmen's failure to incorporate the requirement of conspicu-
ousness into these two sections can be avoided by resort to section 
143. u.c.c. § 2-718(1). 
144. Keeble v. Keeble, 85 Ala. 552, 5 So. 149 (1888); Dunlap Pneumatic Tyre Co., 
Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 79. See generally WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS §§ 783-84 (3d ed. 1961); Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 
CORNELL L.Q. 495, 499-513 (1962). For cases that did not consider the actual-harm 
factor, see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); Berger v. Shana-
han, 142 Conn. 726, 118 A.2d 311 (1955); Mead v. Anton, 33 Wash. 2d 741, 207 P.2d 227 
(1949). 
145. U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(a). 
146. It is not clear whether the conscionability requirement also applies to clauses 
totally disclaiming warranty liability. See text accompanying note 138 supra. 
147. See U.C.C. § 2-316; text accompanying note 130 supra. 
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2-302, which authorizes a court to void any unconscionable contract 
provision. 148 
One of the more unfortunate aspects of the warranty law estab-
lished by the Code is that it was in no way designed to meet the 
problem of inequality of bargaining position. Often a product which 
is a virtual necessity to modem living is presented to a consumer 
on a take-it-as-offered-or-leave-it basis, with the result that any sub-
sequent sale can hardly be said to be the result of actual bargain-
ing.149 It has been argued on the basis of section 2-302 that a buyer's 
lack of a meaningful option in such situations may renqer ineffec-
tual an otherwise enforceable contract clause disclaiming or modify-
ing warranty liability or varying the terms of a warranty.150 However, 
the explanatory comment to section 2-302 states that the pur-
pose of the provision is "not the disturbance of allocation of risks" 
attributable to the superior bargaining power of one of the 
parties.151 Therefore, it would appear that if a disclaimer or modifi-
cation clause is otherwise effective, it is enforceable despite the fact 
that, because of the absence of a feasible alternative, a buyer is 
forced to accept a disproportionate share of the risk.11i2 
A classic example of the type of "adhesion contract" which a 
buyer is often forced to sign in order to do business with a dominant 
seller is the standard automobile sales agreement, by virtue of which 
the extent of a manufacturer's warranty liability is purportedly lim-
ited to repairing or replacing defective parts. Furthermore, even 
this restricted responsibility is frequently assumed only for a limited 
period of time. Traditionally, such limitation provisions have been 
valid; for example, a plaintiff whose automobile had been destroyed 
by a fire caused by a· defective part was regularly denied recovery 
because the manufacturer's liability had been limited to replace-
ment of defective parts or because the applicable warranty had ex-
pired before the fire.15a 
There is an indication of a recent change in attitude on the part 
of some courts toward the standard automobile sales agreement. In 
Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.,154 a Pennsylvania court held that a war-
ranty providing for the replacement of defective parts did not pre-
148. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-719, comment 1: "[A]ny clause purporting to modify or limit 
the remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to 
deletion •••• " 
149. See Kessler, supra note 113. 
150. Comment, 109 U. PA. L. REY. 401, 420 (1961). 
151. U.C.C. § 2-302, comment I. 
152. Boshkoff, supra note 112, at 303; Cudahy, supra note 123, at 129; Hawkland, 
supra note 125, at 37. 
153. Shafer v. Reo Motors, 108 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Hall v. Everett 
Motors, 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960); Norway v. Root, 58 Wash. 2d 96, 361 
P.2d 162 (1961). 
154. 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). 
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elude the existence of a distinct warranty of merchantability upon 
which the plaintiff could rely to recover damages attributable to a 
faulty steering mechanism in a truck produced by the defendant. 
In an action against another automobile manufacturer and his 
dealer to recover for personal injuries sustained while driving an 
allegedly defective car, the New Jersey Supreme Court, noting the 
defendant's "grossly disproportionate bargaining power," declared 
that the manufacturer's "attempted disclaimer of an implied war-
ranty of merchantability and of the obligations arising therefrom is 
so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its 
invalidity. "165 Nevertheless, although there are strong policy argu-
ments in favor of voiding disclaimer, modification, and limitation 
clauses forced upon a buyer by a seller in a vastly superior bargain-
ing position, most courts have enforced these provisions.~66 
Perhaps the problems posed by adhesion contracts could best be 
solved by legislation declaring disclaimer and limitation clauses in-
effective or prima fade unconscionable in particular settings. In this 
respect, the North Dakota legislature has enacted a statute pro-
viding: 
[A]ny person purchasing any gas or oil burning tractor ... for 
his own use shall have a reasonable time after delivery for in-
spection and testing of the same, and if it does not prove to be 
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was purchased, the 
purchaser may rescind the sale .... [A]ny provision in any writ-
ten order or contract of sale . . . which is contrary to the pro-
visions of this section, hereby is declared to be against public 
policy.151 
This provision gives some measure of protection to farmers, who, 
as a class, are in a weak bargaining position in doing business with 
farm equipment dealers.168 
V. WARRANTIES IN NoN-SALE TRANSACTIONS 
Implied warranties of quality are generally considered to arise 
only from sales or contracts to sell. There are, however, other kinds 
of transactions in which, as in sales, it is possible for defective prod-
155. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 
(1960). Although the U.C.C. had not yet been enacted in New Jersey, the court cited 
"section 202." It seems apparent from the context that it actually meant to refer to 
§ 2-302. It is not clear, however, that the draftsmen of the Code intended § 2-302 
to be used merely because one party to a contract was in an extremely favorable bar-
gaining position. See text accompanying note 152 supra. Cases in accord with Hen-
ningsen include State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, llO 
N.W.2d 449 (1961); General Motors Co. v. Dotson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 
655 (1960). 
156. See cases cited note 153 supra. 
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-07-07 (1960). 
158. See Boe v. Tliorbum Herseth, Inc., 13"4 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 1965). 
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ucts capable of causing personal injury, property damage, or eco-
nomic loss to change hands. These types of transactions should rea-
sonably be expected to give rise to warranties similar to those 
normally associated with sales. 
A. Bailments for Hire 
In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, a land-
lord does not impliedly warrant that the premises will be fit for 
the lessee's intended use.159 On the other hand, it is well settled that 
a lease of goods gives rise to a warranty that the wares are reasonably 
suited to the lessee's intended use if the lessor is aware of use con-
templated.160 The reason for imposing such a warranty was suggested 
in the recent New Jersey case of Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Loading 
b Rental Service,161 where the court stated that no warranty is im-
plied by law simply because a particular kind of transaction takes 
place, but rather for the reason that one party "is in a better position 
than the other to know and control the condition of the chattel 
transferred and to distribute the losses which may occur because of 
a dangerous condition the chattel possesses."162 Cintrone involved a 
long-term truck lease under which the lessor had been obligated to 
keep the vehicle in repair. However, the court stated that the ex-
istence of an implied warranty that the rented vehicle was fit for the 
lessee's purpose and that it would remain so was not dependent upon 
this service obligation. The court indicated that its reasoning would 
be equally appropriate in a case involving the more common short-
term chattel lease.163 
With respect to some kinds of goods, renting is almost as com-
monplace as selling.164 Although Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code applies only to actual sales of personal property, its drafts-
men appear to have seen no reason why warranties may not arise 
in connection with other types of transactions, such as bailments for 
hire.165 Like a retailer, a bailor for hire offers articles to the consum-
ing public;166 indeed, there may be more justification for holding 
that implied warranties of quality arise from leases than there is for 
159. 51 C.J.S. Landlord o- Tenant § 304 (1947). 
160. Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM, L. 
REv. 653, 657 (1957); see Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 850, 854 (1959). But cf. Brookshire v. 
Florida Bendix Co., 153 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963) (liability of manufacturer on 
implied warranty of fitness does not extend to lessee or bailee), 
161. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965). 
162. Id. at 445, 212 A.2d at 775. 
163. Id. at 434, 450, 212 A.2d 769, 778 (1965). 
164. "We may take judicial notice of the growth of renting motor vehicles, trucks 
and pleasure cars." Id. at 448, 212 A.2d at 776. 
165. See U.C.C. § 2-313, comment 2. 
166. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Loading &: Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 448, 212 
A.2d 769, 777 (1965). 
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saying that they arise from sales, since a lessee, especially a short-
term lessee, is more likely than a buyer to rely upon a person with 
whom he deals to provide him with a safe product.167 
B. Contracts for Service 
Under the Sales Act, no "sale" occurred when the ownership of 
goods was transferred, pursuant to a service contract and as a neces-
sary incident to the performance of the service.168 This rule appears 
to remain unchanged under the Code. For example, in Epstein v. 
Giannattesio169 a Connecticut court held that no warranties arise 
under the Code with respect to the materials used in giving a beauty 
treatment because a beautician renders a ~ervice and does not "sell" 
goods.170 However, Code section 2-314(1) expressly designates the 
serving of food and drink as a sale for the purpose of implying a 
warranty of merchantability.171 Even before the advent of the Code, 
the great majority of American jurisdictions had already rejected 
the dictum-become-law of Parker v. Flint172 that an innkeeper or 
restaurateur "utters," rather than sells, the food on his menu and 
consequently is not bound by the law of implied warranty.173 
In the leading case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,174 a 
New York court held that a hospital's furnishing blood to a patient 
was not a transaction giving rise to implied warranties. The rule of 
this much criticized decision has apparently been followed by every 
court which has had the opportunity to consider the issue175 and has 
become the basis of legislation in several states.176 On the other hand, 
167. Id. at 456, 212 A.2d at 781; see Farnsworth, supra note 160, at 665. 
168. See Foley Corp. v. I;,ove, 101 A.2d 841 (D.C. Munic.· App. 1954) (construction 
of wall); Sam White Oldsmobile Co. v. Jones Apothecary, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1960) (repair of automobile); I WILLISTON, SALES ~ 9(b) (1948 ed.). 
169. 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (County C.P. 1963). 
170. But see Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Err. 1965), where 
on facts identical to those in Epstein, the court held that plaintiff had stated a cause 
of action for breach of warranty even though the transaction did not constitute a sale. 
171. U.C.C. § 2-314(1); see Ray v. Deas, 112 Geo. App. 191, 144 S.E.2d 468 (1965). 
172. 12 Mod. 254, 88 Eng. Rep. 1303 (K.B. 1699). See generally 38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 
92 (1962). 
173. Prosser indicates that only six states-Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, 
New Hampshire, and Tennessee-have adhered to Parker v. Flint in recent times. 
PROSSER, TORTS § 95, at 655 (3d ed. 1964); see Farnsworth, supra note 160, at 660-62. 
174. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954). 
175. For criticism of the rule, see 69, HARV. L. REv. 391 (1955); 103 U. PA. L. REv. 
833 (1955). The rule has been followed in the following cases: Whitehurst v. American 
Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War 
Memorial Blood Bank, 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. Super. 1965); Krom v. Sharpe &: Dohme, 
Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 761, 180 N.Y.S.2d 792 (1958); Dibblee v. Dr. R. W. Groves Latter 
Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961). · 
It is clear that an express warranty can accompany a blood transfusion. See Napoli 
v. St. Peter's Hosp., 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
176 . .ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1151 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 106, § 2-316(5) 
(1963) (incorporated into the U.C.C. as enacted in Massachusetts); CAL. HEALTH &: 
SAFETY CODE § 1623. 
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warranties have been held to attach to the administration of defec-
tive drugs. In the California case of Gottsdanker v. Gutter Labora-
tories,177 two children contracted poliomyelitis shortly after they had 
been inoculated with Salk vaccine manufactured by the defendant 
and administered by their physician. Although the court found that 
there had been no "sale" at the time of the inoculation, it held the 
manufacturer liable for breach of the implied warranty that had 
arisen when the defendant sold the vaccine to its distributor.178 
While there may be a sufficient distinction between the dispensation 
of vaccine and of blood to justify calling only the former a sale, it is 
probably a public policy favoring hospitals over drug manufacturers 
which leads to the anomalous dichotomy. 
It has been suggested that in dealing with cases involving goods 
transferred as part of the performance of a service, it would be better 
to reason by analogy to sales law rather than calling the passage of 
title a sale.179 In this respect it should be noted that section 2-314 
of the Code, which defines the implied warranty of merchantability, 
does not make the serving of food a sale of goods for all purposes, 
but provides only that "under this section the serving for value of 
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere 
is a sale."180 
Even if the particular transaction in which an injured consumer 
received defective goods is not treated as a sale giving rise to a war-
ranty, recovery may nevertheless be based, as it was in Gottsdanker, 
on a warranty created at the time of some prior transaction, which 
actually was a sale, involving the same goods. Of course, this result 
is possible only in a jurisdiction where a plaintiff is not barred by 
the privity rule from bringing a breach of warranty action against 
someone in the distributive chain other than the person who trans-
ferred the defective product to the plaintiff. For example, in Putman 
v. Erie City Manufacturing Co.,181 a federal court, declaring that 
the privity rule no longer existed in Texas, held that an injured 
plaintiff could maintain an action against the manufacturer of a 
defective wheel chair, although the victim had rented the device 
from a local drugstore. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Warranty theory has long stood out among the legal doctrines 
pertinent to a discussion of products liability as the one providing 
177. 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960). 
178. But see Berry v. American Cyanamide, 341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965), where 
the court, applying Tennessee law, denied recovery on similar facts because of a lack 
of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer. 
179. Farnsworth, supra note 160, at 667. 
180. U.C.C. § 2-314(1). (Emphasis added.) 
181. 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964). 
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the greatest opportunity for a buyer and a seller to allocate freely 
among themselves the potential risk of loss attributable to personal 
injury, property damage, or economic harm caused by substandard 
merchandise. In order to make the law of warranty compatible with 
modern social policy favoring broad consumer protection, the drafts-
men of the Uniform Commercial Code restricted to a considerable 
extent this freedom to apportion. On balance, however, even under 
the Code it remains possible for manufacturers and other sellers to 
pass a significant portion of the risk on to their customers. Indeed, 
the Code demonstrates only a feeble attempt to come to grips with 
the dominant feature in so many situations in which the major share 
of the risk is allotted to the purchaser-the disproportionate bargain-
ing positions of the parties. However, recent cases show that the 
courts have been attempting to alleviate this problem, and much 
attention has been focused upon the result of their efforts-the 
emerging doctrine that a producer or distributor can be strictly 
liable in tort for much of the harm caused by defective products.182 
Nevertheless, in several ways the warranty provisions of the Code 
may be a more desirable basis of recovery than the strict tort theory. 
A plaintiff may recover for breach of a warranty of merchantability 
if a product is merely unfit for the ordinary purpose for which goods 
of that type are used, whereas he is entitled to relief on the strict 
tort theory only if a product was "defective"-a term meaning un-
reasonably dangerous to persons or property.183 This definition of 
a defect not only presents problems of proof, but also precludes a 
strict tort recovery on behalf of a plaintiff who suffers a financial loss 
unaccompanied by personal injury or property damage.184 
Even one injured by a product which was defective in the strict 
tort sense may prefer to frame his case against his seller in terms of 
breach of warranty in order to take advantage of a longer statute of 
limitations.185 Code section 2-725 establishes a four-year statute of 
limitations on a cause of action for breach of contract186-a period 
considerably longer than the typical one- to two-year interval within 
which a tort suit for personal injuries must be commenced.187 How-
182. See generally Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negli-
gence, and Strict Tort Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1350 (1966). 
183. 2 R.Esl'ATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965). 
184. Id., comment d; see Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 8, 403 P.2d 145 
(1965); Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965). But see Santor v. A &: M Karagheu-
sian, 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (consumer recovered against manufacturer for 
defective rug). 
185. E.g., George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1964). 
186. Before the enadment of the Code, most states had equally long or longer statutes 
of limitations on contract actions. See Freedman, Products Liability Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code in New York and Other States, 19 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 178, 191 
n.38 (1964). Section 2-725 also provides that the period may be shortened to a period 
as short as one year by agreement, but may not be extended. 
187. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965). 
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ever, this provision cuts both ways, for while the Code provides a 
comparatively long period for bringing contract claims, it also stipu-
lates that this period commences when a breach occurs, which, in the 
case of a typical warranty, is at the time of tender of delivery.188 If 
a buyer is injured after the statute has run, he is barred from main-
taining a warranty action regardless of whether he knew before the 
• expiration of the statute that a breach of warranty had occurred.180 
On the other hand, the statute of limitations on a tort action begins 
to run at the time of the injury.190 In reality, it is unlikely that a 
defect in a product at the time of sale would not be discovered 
within four years. Furthermore, in the case of a warranty relating to 
future performance of a product, the Code provides that a cause of 
action accrues when a breach should have been discovered.191 
William C. Pelster 
188. U.C.C. § 2-725(2); see McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 896, 
899 (W .D. Pa. 1963). 
189. u.c.c. § 2-725(2). 
190. Annot., 4 A.L.R.!!d 821 (1965). 
191. U.C.C. § 2-725(2). An example of a warranty of this type is one relating to 
the germination of seeds. see, e.g., Bell v. Menzies, 110 Ga. App. 432, 138 S.E.2d 781 
(1964); Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of 
Sales, 8 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 281, 333 (1961). 
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